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## NOTES AND NEWS

A MEETING of the Aristotelian Society was held in London on January 8, Dr. H. Wildon Carr, president, in the chair.

A paper was read by Mr. C. D. Broad on "Hume's Theory of the Credibility of Miracles." Hume's general argument against miracles is, he maintained, weak. On Hume's definition two miracles of the same kind (*e. g.*, two raisings from the dead) could not occur. Yet believers in miracles hold this to be possible. If one reported exception to an alleged law ought to make *no* difference to the strength of our belief in it, why should two or more? But if one reported exception makes *some* difference in the strength of our belief in the law, how can we be sure *a priori* that it may not in certain cases reduce our belief to doubt or disbelief? If people had acted on Hume's theory, many scientific discoveries would not have been made. For exceptions to many alleged general laws ought, if Hume be right, to have been treated, except by their discoverers, as alleged miracles, and disbelieved. Since those who observe the exceptions are experimentalists, and those who explain them are often mathematicians, such exceptions would never have been explained if the mathematicians had taken up Hume's attitude. Actually the belief of most people in most laws of nature depends on testimony. Hence the arguments for and against an alleged miracle are arguments of testimony against testimony. Strictly, in accordance with his view of belief and induction, Hume had no right to talk about what we *ought* to believe as to matters of fact, but only to discuss the causes of our beliefs. And love of the wonderful is as good a cause of belief in a miracle as constant experience is a cause of belief in a natural law.

PROFESSOR S. P. HAYES has leave of absence from Mount Holyoke College for the present semester. He is spending the half-year at the Pennsylvania Institution for the Blind in Overbrook, where he is giving mental tests and making a study of the psychology of the blind. His work at Mount Holyoke is in charge of Dr. J. H. Coffin, professor of philosophy and psychology in Earlham College.

DR. ROBERT M. YERKES, of the department of psychology of Harvard University, and psychologist to the psychopathic hospital of Boston, lectured recently before the Minnesota chapter of Sigma Xi on "Psychological Methods of Examination and Diagnosis."

PROFESSOR JAMES ROWLAND ANGELL, of the University of Chicago, is giving a course of lectures on "The Makers of Modern Psychology" on the Spencer Foundation at Union College.